Exporters are fewless than one fth among U.S. manufacturing rmsand are larger than non-exporting rmsabout 4-5 times more total sales per rm. These facts are often cited as support for models with economies of scale and rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003). We nd that the basic Melitz model cannot simultaneously match the size and share of exporters given the observed distribution of total sales. Instead exporters are expected to be between 90 and 100 times larger than non-exporters. It is easy to reconcile the model with the data. However, a lot of variation independent of rm size is needed to do so. This suggests that economies of scale play only a minor role in determining the export status of a rm. We show that the augmented model also has markedly dierent implications in the event of a trade liberalization. Most of the adjustment is through the intensive margin and productivity gains due to reallocation are halved.
Introduction
Exporters represent less than one fth of all the U.S. manufacturing rms, and are larger than non-exporterstotal sales per rm are about 4-5 times higher for exporters.
1 These stylized facts are often cited as support for models with economies of scale and rm heterogeneity.
In Melitz (2003) , only larger, more productive rms generate enough net revenues abroad to cover the xed costs associated with exporting. A key implication is that, in the event of a trade liberalization, resources will be reallocated towards the more productive rms, raising the average productivity in the industry.
In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of the Melitz model for the frequency and characteristics of exporters. We focus on the size of exporters as economies of scale are at the core of the theory in Melitz (2003) . According to the basic version of the Melitz model, we should observe strict sorting by size, that is, the smallest exporter should be larger than the largest non-exporter. The set of exporters is thus easily characterized with a cut-o rule in terms of total sales. We use this equilibrium restriction to derive the quantitative predictions of the theory without having to specify the full model.
We nd that the basic Melitz model cannot simultaneously match the share and size of exporters in the data given the large skewness observed in the distribution of total sales.
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Given that exporters are roughly one fth of all rms, strict sorting suggests that exporters should be concentrated in the top quintile of the rm size distribution. We can thus obtain the model prediction for the size of exporters by comparing the top quintile rms with the rest. We nd that the rms below the top quintile are quite small (an average of $740,000 total sales), while the rms in the top quintile are much larger ($70 million on average).
Hence the basic Melitz model greatly overpredicts the exporter size premium: exporters should have between 90 and 100 times more total sales than non-exporters.
Of course we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in the data. Melitz (2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of other idiosyncratic factors, unrelated to size, in the rm's decision to export. For example, the costs of exporting variable or xedmay vary from rm to rm.
We proceed to reconcile the model with the data by introducing further rm-level heterogeneity. At rst pass we take a latent variable approach so there is no need to specify which are the additional sources of variation in the export decisiononly that these factors are independent of the rm size. We nd that we need a lot of independent variation in order to bridge the large gap between the model and the data. This suggests that economies of scale, as captured by xed costs, are not the main determinant of the export status of a rm.
1 Both facts are documented in Bertrand, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) for the universe of U.S. manufacturing rms operating in 2002. 2 We use the distribution of total sales for manufacturing rms (NAICS code [31] [32] [33] as given by the 2002 Statistics of U.S. Businesses of the Census.
Importantly, we nd that the large amount of independent variation needed waters down the core mechanism in the Melitz model. To illustrate this we set up a very simple, partial equilibrium model based on Melitz (2003) . We then explore two versions of the model. In the rst version productivity is the only source of variation across rms. The model displays the strict sorting property and, as we discussed above, overstates the size of exporters. In the second version we assume rms face heterogeneous xed costs. We then calibrate the distribution of xed costs to match the share and size of exporters.
3 From the previous discussion, we know we need a huge amount of dispersion in the xed costs. We then compare the models in the event of a trade liberalization, with trade costs falling by half.
We nd that, in the aggregate, both models are undistinguishable from a representativerm model. Free entry amplies the response of exports to a trade liberalization through the love-of-variety eect. However, rm-level heterogeneity virtually cancels all the amplication introduced by free entry.
4
Behind the similarities in the aggregates there are large dierence in the margins of adjustment. Critically, the augmented model has only a minor role for the extensive margin.
First, there is much less entry than in the standard Melitz model in response to a fall in trade costs. We nd that the growth rate of the number of exporters is more than 60% in the strict sorting version, but only 15% when all the latent heterogeneity is accounted for. Second, new and existing exporters have relatively similar size in the latent heterogeneity model. This stands in marked contrast with the standard Melitz model in which new exporters are 10 to 12 times smaller than the average exporter prior to the trade liberalization. The dierences across models are more striking given that both models have very similar implications for the aggregate trade variables.
We seek to quantify further the role of the extensive margin in both models. To this end we decompose total export growth in an intensive and extensive margin. In the standard version the extensive margin accounts for more than 60% percent of the trade growth. Once we match the size of exporters, the extensive margin accounts for less than 20%. The muted response of export participation is quite surprising given the Melitz model is by now considered the workhorse model for the fast-growing literature on the extensive margin.
We also look at the productivity gains due to the reallocation eect across both models.
We nd that the productivity gains due to the trade liberalization are halved in the augmented model. This is perhaps not surprising given the previous results. However, it must be noted that we miss on the productivity gains due to exit in the domestic market since 3 The distribution of xed costs is the only dierence between the two models. We use a common value for all remaining parameters, including those governing the distribution of productivity. 4 In a recent paper, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) nd that the rms' responses to a trade liberalization do not quantitatively impact the implications for aggregate productivity and welfare in a general equilibrium model. We must emphasize that ours is a partial-equilibrium model, so the osetting eects are not due to factor prices or aggregate demand adjusting in general equilibrium. See also Arkolakis et al. (2008) . our model is partial equilibrium and the wage rateor more generally, unit costsis taken as given.
Finally, we explore alternative specications for the additional heterogeneity. First we discuss the presence of small exporters in the data, that is, exporters with few export sales.
This observation has spurred some recent research, most notably Arkolakis (2008) . We argue that, as long as the strict sorting is preserved, the size of exporters will be overstated in the model. Moreover we show that introducing latent heterogeneity gives rise to a signicant fraction of small exporters even with a constant export intensity. We also ask whether the latent heterogeneity stems from dierences across broadly-dened industries. If that were the case we would nd that the size premium of exporters within each industry would be closer to the data. Instead we nd that for each 3-digit manufacturing industry the implied size premium remains implausibly large.
We then move to the possibility that the xed costs of exporting are sunk. In this case there is exporter hysteresis and the particular history of each rm can be the source of heterogeneity at play. More importantly, this form of heterogeneity would be compatible with large adjustments along the extensive margin. We show that sunk costs can easily match the share and size of exporters. However, it is now the size of the new exporters that presents a puzzle: new exporters would be signicantly larger than incumbent exporters.
Our paper relates to a growing body of work that studies the extensive margin and its quantitative implications in open macroeconomic models. In an early contribution, Ruhl We are also not the rst to introduce additional heterogeneity in the Melitz model. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) estimate a partial-equilibrium model with entry and exit for Colombian data. The estimation assumes a very rich error structure and thus many possible sources of heterogeneity, including stochastic xed costs. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) report that xed costs are, on average, quite large. Our focus is instead on the dispersion needed to match the data rather than the point estimates. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz In Section 4 we present a simple structural framework that is exible enough to encompass strict sorting and additional sources of heterogeneity. The implications of the latent heterogeneity are then explored in Section 5. We discuss some alternative specications for the heterogeneity in Section 6. We also include a brief discussion on the empirical literature on the extensive margin. Section 8 concludes.
On the Size of Exporters
In the Melitz model, rm i will export only if its foreign sales, net of the associated variable costs, would cover the xed costs associated with exporting,
Firms dier in their labor productivity or in the quality of goods produced. Either way, more ecient rms can generate more net income abroad and are thus more likely to be exporters.
Hence the model predicts that exporters are more productive and sell higher quality goods than non-exporters. Incidentally, more ecient rms also sell more in the domestic market, so exporters are unambiguously larger than non-exporters in terms of total sales. These qualitative predictions are borne in the data and often cited as support for the Melitz model. We seek to explore the quantitative predictions of the model on the exporters' characteristics. The rst step is to rewrite the entry condition (1) in terms of total sales. Data on total rm revenue are easily accessible and, more importantly, we can observe a rm's total sales independently of whether the rm exports or not. In the basic Melitz model, there is a tight relationship between a rm's total sales and its underlying eciency parameter: a rm with higher productivity will always have more total sales in equilibrium. Since net income abroad is also strictly increasing in productivity, we have an increasing, monotone relationship between total sales and net income abroadeven if the latter is a counterfactual because the rm does not export.
We can thus summarize the model's predictions for the set of exporters with a simple threshold rule in place of (1): rm i will export only if its total sales r i are above some level t, r i ≥ t.
It is immediate that exporters and non-exporters are strictly sorted by size, that is, the smallest exporting rm has more total sales than the largest non-exporting rm. The value of the threshold level t is determined in equilibrium and is bound to depend on the model's parameters.
We can, though, easily derive the model's predictions using the share of exporters and the distribution of total sales observed in the data. The threshold condition (2) implies that the share of exporters is equal to the fraction of rms with total sales equal or larger than t. We have thus that
where Ψ r is the empirical c.d.f. of total sales, and s x is the fraction of rms with positive export sales. In other words, we can solve for the (1 − s x )th percentile in the distribution of total sales and obtain the threshold t consistent with the observed share of exporters. We can then easily compute the truncated mean, to be quite small under strict sorting: rms below $1 million sales average less than $320, 000 in sales and would constitute over 70% of all non-exporters. At the same time, exporters will be pretty large. Firms above $1 million average $82 million in total sales and would represent over 80% of all the exporters. We want to be a little bit more precise than this, though. For the rms within the range $1 − $5 million we do not know the exact distribution: we assume these rms follow a two-side truncated Pareto distribution, parameterized to match the average total sales in the range ($2.26 million).
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We nd that strict sorting by size implies that exporters should sell, on average, between 90 and 100 times more than non-exporters. The exporter size premium remains very large for whatever distribution one assumes for the rms in the range $1 − $5 million. As a check we computed a lower bound on the exporter's size by taking all rms with sales between $1 million and $5 million to be identical, with total sales equal to the bin's average ($2.26 million). This would be the smallest exporter size premium compatible with strict sorting and the data. Even in this case we nd that exporters are predicted to be more than 80 times larger than non-exporters.
How does the implied exporter size premium compare with the data? Bertrand et al. The model cannot match the size of exporters and non-exporters even if we allow some leeway in the fraction of exporters. Table 3 reproduces the previous exercise for dierent assumptions on the fraction of exporters, s x . As we increase the share of exporters, the 6 There is no need to assume anything about the distribution of rms outside this size bin: they are all squarely in the exporter or non-exporter category.
7 Table 3 in Bertrand et al. (2007) states that the dierence in average log shipments between exporters and non-exporters is 1.48 for the same set of rms we used. The nding that exporters are larger than non-exporters has also been conrmed for plants and establishments, as well as for other countries. The size dierences are all in the range between 4 and 6. In this Section we work with total sales rather than log total sales so we can use the information in Table 1 The lack of t due to strict sorting can also be understood in terms of the conditional probability of exporting given the rm size. In the basic Melitz, the conditional probability is a step function of rm size, taking value 0 if r i is below the cuto t, and one otherwise.
Larger rms are indeed more likely to export in the data, but only a little bit more. In other words, the conditional probability rises only slowly with rm size in the data while it rises very sharply in the model. We nd the dierences in the conditional probability between the model and the data are somewhat harder to summarize and interpret in economic terms.
In addition, any measure of t would depend on the level of detail available in the data.
Computing the exporter size premium in both model and data is easier, plus the dierences are readily stated in economic terms.
We also experimented with a parameterized Pareto distribution for the total sales distribution. If Ψ r is Pareto, we have that the cuto t is given by t = (s x ) −1/k where k is the slope parameter of the Pareto distribution. The unconditional average rm size µ can be decomposed in the conditional averages
where µ nx and µ x are the average total sales for exporter and non-exporters respectively. For a Pareto distribution, µ x /µ is equal to the cuto t and we have that
Estimates of the slope parameter in Axtell (2001) This lack of t with the empirical distribution explains why a Pareto distribution can imply a lower size premium than our non-parametric lower bound.
Introducing Latent Heterogeneity
Of course we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in the data. Melitz (2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of other idiosyncratic factors, unrelated to size, in the rm's decision to export. For example, the costs of exporting variable or xedmay vary from rm to rm. It is possible then a low-productivity rm nds exporting protable simply because it is quite cheap to transport its product. Alternatively we could think that whatever makes a product successful in the domestic market does not always translate into more sales in the foreign market. Clearly once we consider these additional factors the strict sorting of exporters no longer holds.
Fitting the data
Here we proceed to reconcile the model with the data by introducing the necessary rm-level heterogeneity in the export decision. We rewrite the threshold condition (2) in terms of a latent variable, t i . A rm i exports if its total sales satisfy
The latent variable is identically and independently distributed across rms, with a c.d.f. Ψ t over support + .
With the latent variable condition (3) we can capture all the underlying heterogeneity without having to specify the sources of variation. Indeed the only structure imposed on the latent variable is that is independent of the rm size. As in the previous Section, we can postpone laying out and solving the structural model while seeing through the model's implications given the data.
It is now useful to t the empirical distribution of total sales with a parametric distribution. We use a lognormal distribution with mean µ r = 6.3 and standard deviation σ r = 2.6so we reproduce the average total sales (in thousands of dollars) as well as the approximated location of the 82th percentile. The use of the lognormal distribution for rm size has a long tradition in economics. See Aitchison and Brown (1969) for a complete treatment of the distribution.
We also assume that the latent variable t i follows a lognormal distribution. This is mainly a choice of convenience: we want a exible two-parameter distribution dened over positive numbers. We pick the mean µ t and standard deviation σ t such that the model reproduces the share and size of exporters. That is, we solve for µ t and σ t such that equations
reproduce the observed values for the share of exporters, s x = .18, and the average log total sales of exporters, E {log (r i ) |r i ≥ t i } = 5.66. The latent variable is very dispersed: we nd that the parameter values matching moments (4)- (5) are µ t = 13.73 and σ t = 7.7. These parameters imply that the coecient of variation of the latent variable is many orders of magnitude larger than for total sales! We explored an array of parameters for the distribution of total sales and found always that we need a huge dispersion for the latent variable in order to reproduce the share and size of exporters. More precisely, we consider values µ r in the range 5.5 − 7.5 and σ r in the range 2 − 3. The resulting parameters for µ t and σ t were always above 10 and 5 respectively.
There also good reasons to view our ndings as a lower bound on the dispersion of the latent variable. Firms often carry multiple product lines and there are many foreign markets to serve. However, it only takes one product to be exported to one destination for a rm to be called an exporter. Hence, if we think each market/product oers an independent opportunity to export, we have to see the latent variable t i as the minimum realization among the ensemble of product-and destination-specic thresholds. Thus the underlying distribution from which the product-and destination-specic latent variables are drawn would feature much more dispersion.
The results are perhaps not that surprising: after all we have to make up for a large gap between the model and the data in the size premium of exporters. In order to reduce the size of exporters we need the latent variable to take very large values with high probability, so some large rms do not export. Simultaneously, some other rms must draw a low realization of the latent variable and export independently of their size.
9 8 Here we use the log total sales instead of total sales, so the exporter size premium is now given by the dierence in average log total sales between exporters and non exporters. The change of units has virtually no implication for the parameters of the latent variable distributionbut it turns out to be very convenient for the calibration of the model later. 9 It is also necessary to introduce latent heterogeneity in a Melitz model in order to match the dynamic facts. Entry and exit rates in foreign markets are relatively high, as documented in Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005). The volatility of rm employment in the data is clearly too low to explain these high rates in a basic Melitz model: rms rarely grow or contract enough to start and stop exporting so frequently. See Atkeson and Burstein (2008) for a discussion.
The role of rm size
The huge dispersion of the latent variable indicates that size plays only a small role in the determination of the export status of a rm. We can illustrate this point with a simple exercise. Note that given a rm size r i , the probability that rm i exports is
Given our results for Ψ t , a rm of median size exports with probability .167, very close to the unconditional probability of .18.
10 In other words, a rm of median size could be taken as representative of the industry as a whole. In contrast, a rm with the median latent variable will export only with probability .0016. .0016 .1881 Table 4 : Conditional probability of exporting
In the next Section we will explore the implications of the additional heterogeneity in the context of a structural model. Here we anticipate our main result with a simple exercise that illustrates how the predictions for the extensive margin crucially depend on whether we match the exporter size in the data or not.
The exercise is as follows: we increase the total sales of all rms by a constant percentage δ. We then look at the predictions for the growth rate of the number of exporters for both models: the strict sorting model given by (2) and the latent variable model given by (3). It must be emphasized that there is no change either in the threshold or the distribution of the latent variable. Table 5 reports the ndings for the growth rate in the number of exporters for revenue increases of 5%, 10% and 20%. The strict sorting model predicts a relatively large fraction of rms change status from non-exporter to exporters. For a 10% increase in total sales the model predicts 5.29% growth rate in exporters. The distribution of total sales is still pretty thick just below the 82nd percentile. Because size is the only determinant of the export status of a rm, all the rms whose total log sales were originally between log(t) − log(δ) and log(t) will export after the revenue increase.
In contrast the latent variable model predicts much smaller growth rates for the number of exporters. For a 10% increase in total revenue, only 2.23% of rms switch export status. 10 The median size is given by exp (µ r ) or approximately $600, 000.
Strict Sorting Table 5 : Growth rate of the number of exporters
In Figure 1 we have plotted the distribution (PDF) of normalized log total sales: log(r i )− log(t i ) for both models. Thus for the strict sorting model we just have the distribution of log total sales, centered such that the 82-percentile is equal to zero. The resulting distribution is plotted as a dashed line. For the latent heterogeneity, normalized log total sales are way more dispersed, reecting the huge variation in the latent variable. The distribution is plotted in a solid line.
The key observation in Figure 1 is that the mass of rms close to the threshold is much larger under strict sorting than in the latent heterogeneity model. Thus any displacement of the distribution to the right brings more rms above the threshold in the strict sorting, as documented in Table 5 . In the latent heterogeneity, the gain in size must be quite large in order to overcome the other determinants of the exporting decision.
A Simple Framework of Exports and Exporters
In this Section we set up a small model with economies of scale and rm-heterogeneity. The model is simpler than Melitz (2003) in that it is partial equilibrium, taking the wage rate as given. As a result the model abstracts from entry and exit in the domestic market.
We explore the implications of the additional heterogeneity for a trade liberalization episode. To this end we consider two versions of the model. In the rst one there is strict sorting, so the model does not match the size of exporters. In the second one we introduce the needed variation as a random xed cost. The rest of the parameters are common across models. Finally we briey sketch three simpler models for comparison purposes.
Framework
There is a set Ω of rms that produce and sell in the home country. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, denoted ϕ, and the xed costs that they face if they start exporting, denoted f . Productivity and xed costs are independently distributed over + with c.d.f. G and H respectively. We summarize a rm by its type ω = {ϕ, f }. The set of rms Ω (and their distribution) is taken as a given.
Each rm is the single producer of a dierentiated good with technology
where l (ω) is the labor demanded by rm ω. Consumers in the home country aggregate the dierentiated goods according to
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and y d (ω) denotes the output of rm ω sold in the home country. The demand for each good ω is given by
is the price elasticity, p d (ω) the price set by rm ω, and the price index P d is given by
Firms are monopolistic competitors and internalize the downward sloping demand for its product. The prot-maximization problems leads to the familiar price equation
where w is the wage rate. We take the wage rate as exogenously given, so ours is a partial equilibrium model.
It is clear that only the productivity parameter ϕ will determine domestic sales. We can thus write p d (ϕ) and y d (ϕ). The c.e.s. demand structure also implies that rm ϕ revenues from domestic sales can be expressed
where R d are total sales revenues in the domestic market, and
is the average productivity dened as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) . Since we take both the wage and the distribution of rms in the home country as given, total domestic sales R d are also exogenously determined.
11 We will still make use of the relationship between productivity and domestic sales given by (6). We now move to the determination of exports and exporters. Not all rms export: let Ω x denote the set of rms that do and M x its measure. We normalize the measure of all rms to one, so M x is also the share of exporters. Consumers in the foreign country aggregate the subset of exported goods according to
where y f (ω) is the output of rm ω sold in the foreign country. The foreign demand for
Finally we assume there is an aggregate demand for exports, given by
where Y * is the (exogenously given) income of the foreign country, and ν is the price elasticity of aggregate exports of the home country. We assume that ν < θ , that is, exports of the home country are closer substitutes of each other than they are of a good produced elsewhere.
Let us rst solve for the export revenues of any given rm taking as given the set of
exporters Ω x . Prot-maximization implies that
where τ > 1 is an iceberg trade cost associated with exports. It is clear again that, conditional on exporting, only the productivity parameter ϕ determines sales.
The c.e.s demand system allows us to write a rm's export revenues as a function of the average export revenues within exporters,
where R f is total export sales and
is the average productivity among exporters. Note that the set of exporters Ω x aects the export revenues of each rm (10) both through the share of exporters M x and the productivity distribution within the set.
Last but most certainly not least, we get to the determination of the set of exporters Ω x . A rm that exports incurs in a per period xed cost. As a result, a rm ω will only nd protable to export if its net income abroad would cover the xed expenses,
where we have used that export net income, that is, export revenues minus costs, can be expressed as r f (ϕ (ω)) /θ. Thus the set of exporters Ω x is the set of rms ω ∈ Ω such that the entry condition (11) holds. However, export revenues depend themselves on the set of exporters, so in equilibrium exports and exporters are determined simultaneously.
Strict sorting and latent heterogeneity
We now consider two versions of the model above. In the rst we stick to the basic Melitz model and shut down the heterogeneity in the xed costs. As a result exporters and nonexporters are strictly sorted by size and the model inherits the inability to match the size of exporters as documented in Section 2. We name this rst version of the model after the strict sorting property. In the second calibration we use the dispersion on xed costs to reproduce the latent variable distribution we worked out in Section 3. By construction the model then matches the share and size of exporters. We label this calibration as the latent heterogeneity model.
It must be emphasized that the only dierence between the two models is the distribution of xed costs. The models will share the same parameter values for the elasticities, trade costs, and the distribution of productivity. We will also set the exogenous variables such that both models match the same facts in the data.
We start with the common parameters. We set the elasticity of substitution across The last common parameter is the distribution of productivity, G. For the calibration we want to use the observed distribution for total sales. Unfortunately the mapping from the productivity distribution to the total sales distribution is not the same for both versions of the model.
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It is thus not possible to have thus a common parametrization for G that matches the observed distribution of total sales in both models. However, we do not want any dierence in the calibration of the models to govern the resultsother than the size 12 Both models share the mapping from G to the distribution of domestic total sales. The distribution of export sales, though, are dierent for each model. of exporters, that is. We thus adopt the following compromise: we set the productivity distribution to capture all the variation in total sales. More precisely, we take G to be a lognormal distribution with standard deviation equal to σ ϕ = σ r / (θ − 1). The location parameter can be set such that the average productivityφ among all producers is normalized to one. Std.Dev. Log-productivity σ ϕ .37
Mean Log-productivity µ ϕ -0.48 Table 6 : Calibration -Common Parameters
Finally we get to what makes the strict sorting and latent heterogeneity models dierent.
For the strict sorting we shut down all the variation in the xed cost, so H is a degenerate distribution at some point f . The value of the xed cost f is set such that the share of exporters is 18% as in the data. For the latent heterogeneity model we calibrate the distribution of xed costs H such that we capture all the variation in the latent variable t i .
For this it is very convenient to use a log normal distribution for xed costs so the mapping is simple. By construction the latent heterogeneity model replicates the observed exporter size premium; by appropriate choice of the location parameter we match the share of exporters as well. The resulting parameters are µ f = .98 and σ f = 7.69.
Three analytical models
While our analysis is based on the two models just described, we nd it useful to consider three simpler models for comparison purposes: a representative rm model, a homogenous rm model, and a heterogeneous-productivity model with a Pareto distribution. In these three models we can derive the relationship between total exports and trade costs in closed form. This helps build an intuition about the mechanisms at play in the richer, full model.
Representative rm model. There is a representative rm which exports under all circumstances. In terms of the framework above, we encompass the representative rm model by having a degenerate distribution of rm productivity and a xed cost equal to zero.
There are, thus, no changes in the measure of rms exporting or the average productivity of exporters. We express the price of exports (8) in terms of logs,
where all terms that are constant are collected in const. Substituting in the aggregate demand for exports (9) we have the simplest model of exports,
We maintain the same value for the price-elasticity ν given in Table 6 .
Homogenous rm model. We introduce entry by assuming a positive xed cost but abstract from all heterogeneity: all rms have identical labor productivity and face the same xed cost of exporting. Some rms, though, export while some other do not. This can be an equilibrium only if rms are actually indierent between exporting or not, so the entry condition (11) holds with equality. Since there is no rm heterogeneity, the entry condition (11) eectively pins down the average export sales,
Thus all the adjustment in this model occurs through entry, as rms do not change their export intensity in response to trade costs.
Since all rms have identical productivity, there is no change in the average productivity of exporters either. The export price (8) is thus a function of the trade costs and the share of exporters,
We substitute the export price in the aggregate demand for exports (9) to obtain
Finally we use that log (R f ) = log (M x ) + const to obtain total export revenues as a function of the trade cost,
The assumption that θ > ν guarantees that the export revenues increase with a fall in trade costs, as we would expect. We maintain the same value for parameters ν and θ given in Table 6 .
Heterogeneous-productivity rms with a Pareto distribution. The last of our models features heterogeneous rms and an identical xed cost of exporting. The only dierence with the strict sorting model discussed above is that productivity follows a Pareto distribution.
This allows us to solve for the model analytically but has stark implications for the margin of adjustment, as it will be clear very soon.
We now have to simultaneously solve for the export demand (9) and the entry condition (11) . We start with the latter. Assuming that there is a subset of rms that do not export, the entry condition must hold with equality.
13 The rm's export revenues are strictly increasing in productivity, ϕ, so we can characterize the set of exporters with a simple threshold rule.
The set of exporters Ω x is then given by the set of rms ϕ ≥φ x and thus M x = 1 − G (φ x ).
Using the c.d.f. for the Pareto distribution we have that
where k is the slope parameter associated with the Pareto distribution.
We now get to use the key property of the Pareto distribution that allows for an analytical solution. It is easy to show that if ϕ is distributed according to a Pareto distribution with slope k, then we have a linear relationship betweenφ x andφ x ,
We write the export revenues of rmφ x in terms of the average export revenues using (10),
and it is immediate that the average export sales are pin down by the entry condition,
Thus average export sales do not respond to trade costs, so the growth rate in total revenues equals the growth rate in the number of exporters.
14 This stark implication does not hold for other productivity distributions.
We are set to solve the model. The export price (8) is
Using the relationships betweenφ x andφ x as well as (14),
Now we substitute in the aggregate demand for exports to obtain
where we have used that the average exports are constant. 13 Since the support for the Pareto distribution is unbounded, there is always a rm that nds it protable to export.
14 Note that the export sales per rm increase with a fall in trade costs: however, new exporters are smaller than incumbents and drive the average down.
Trade liberalization
We compare the two model's predictions for export growth in response to a fall in trade costs.
The exercise is labeled as a trade liberalization but there is no distinction in our model whether it is a tari reduction or an improvement in the shipping technology. 15 We consider a range of trade liberalizations up to a halving of the trade costsa fall of 25 percentage points.
Aggregate response
We nd that both models have virtually identical implications for trade volume. Why do the two models predict so similar aggregate trade patterns? The reason is that, in this respect, both models are very similar to the representative rm model presented in Section 4.3. This is quite obvious in Figure 3 , where we have added the representative rm model, indicated with a dotted line. We plot export growth (top) and the export price growth (bottom) as a function of the fall in trade costs. Clearly all three models are very similar in both prices and quantities.
It may be puzzling at rst that rm-level heterogeneity and the extensive margin do not make a dierence for aggregate variables. The intuition for this is that rm-level heterogeneity essentially cancels the boost in trade due to the extensive margin. We can illustrate this by comparing rst the representative rm model with the homogenous rm model and then with the heterogenous-productivity rm model with a Pareto distribution.
Endogenous entry amplies the response of export revenues to a fall in trade costs. A simple comparison of the representative rm model (12) and the homogeneous rm model (13) backs the claim: the elasticity of export revenues with respect to trade costs is augmented by (θ − 1)/(θ − ν), which is always greater than one. Everything else constant, more exporters bring the aggregate price of exports down through a love-of-variety eect. As long as there is entry, the price of exports will then fall by more than one-to-one with trade costs, and sustain additional demand for exports. For the choice of parameters reported in Table   15 Or, for that matter, an exogenous change in the real exchange rate. 6 , the response of trade volume is more than twice as large in the homogenous rm model than in the representative rm model.
We now look at the heterogeneous-productivity rm model with a Pareto distribution to see how the trade response changes with rm heterogeneity. Comparing (15) and (13) For low slope parameters k the Pareto distribution features a thick tail. In this case the response of exports to a fall in trade costs is quite muted. The rms that start exporting in response to the fall in trade costs are less productive than incumbent exporters. Thus the average productivity among exporters falls rapidly, which in turn drives the aggregate price of exports. The more skewed is the distribution of productivity, the faster the average productivity drops with entry.
Quantitatively, we nd that the heterogeneity cancels virtually all the amplication introduced by entry, rendering the heterogeneous and the representative rm models very similar in their implications for export growth. We base this assertion on the skewness of the empirical distribution of total sales. In the model the right tail of total sales is distributed according to a Pareto with slope parameter k/(θ − 1). The right tail in the observed distribution of total sales is well approximated by a Pareto with a slope parameter ξ in the range 1.02 − 1.06. Setting k = ξ(θ − 1) we can rewrite the response of exports in the heterogenous rm model (15) as
From the above expression it is clear that if ξ is close to one, then the term (ξ − 1)/ξ is approximately zero and the heterogeneous rm model is very close to the representative rm model (12).
Margins of adjustment
Behind the similarities in the response of aggregate trade the models display marked differences in the adjustment in the number of exporters. The top panel in Figure 4 plots the growth rate in the number of exporters for each model. In the strict sorting model the number of exporters grows very fast. Entry drives up the number of exporters up by almost 60% when trade costs fall by 25 percentage points. Even with a small drop in trade costs like 5 percentage points the number of exporters grow by more than 10%, suggesting that even at relatively high frequencies entry could play an important role.
In contrast, there is not much entry in the foreign market in the latent heterogeneity model. The growth rate of the number of exporters barely gets over 15%, one fourth of the growth in the strict sorting model. For smaller trade costs reductions like 5%, the number of exporters is very close to at. The similarities for total trade volume only make the dierences in entry even more striking.
We seek to quantify further the role of export entry in both models. We decompose the growth rate of exports in the change of export intensity and participation,
The rst term on the right hand side is the intensive margin, that is, the growth rate on the average export revenues per exporter; and the second is the extensive margin, or the growth in the number of exporters. We normalize export growth by total sales, and express each margin as a percentage of the total.
16 Table 7 collects the results for trade cost reductions of 5, 15, and 25 percentage points. In the strict sorting model the extensive margin is more than 60% of the growth rate in exports. However entry plays a much minor role in the latent heterogeneity model, just below 20%. These numbers are very similar across the range of trade cost cuts. They are also quite robust to alternative parameterizations for elasticities.
This leads us to the conclusion that once the Melitz model is at odds with a large role for the extensive margin once it is augmented to account for the share and size of exporters. 17 This is a direct consequence of the strict sorting: since exporters are almost 100 times larger than non-exporters, the rm at the threshold is still quite large compared with non-exporters but, more importantly, it is very small compared with exporters.
Returning to Table 2 in Section 2, the smallest exporter has about 5 times more total sales than the average non-exporter, but 18 times less total sales than the average exporter. 16 We are following closely, although we do not distinguish between export intensity and premium as they do. 17 Because previous exporters grow rapidly with the trade liberalization, the new exporters are 50 times smaller when compared with the average size the incumbent exporter after the trade costs decrease. We now evaluate the main mechanism in Melitz (2003) , namely, the gains in average productivity in the industry due to the trade liberalization. We follow Melitz (2003) and
as the aggregate productivity.
18 It must be noted that our model can only do a partial evaluation. Since we take the wage rate as given, the set of non-exporters does not change so there are no productivity gains from the exit of the least productivity rms as in Melitz (2003).
We nd the aggregate productivity grows signicantly less in the latent heterogeneity model than in the strict sorting model. Figure 5 plots the results. Aggregate productivity growth in the latent heterogeneity is about half the one in the strict sorting modela ratio that is approximately constant across the range of trade cost decreases.
That productivity gains are smaller is not surprising given our previous results. Given that we abstract from exit in the domestic market, it can be said that the mechanism in Melitz (2003) works through the selection and entry of exporters. First, exporters are more productive than the average rm, so anything that expands the total employment of exporters will lead to productivity gains due to composition eects. Second, new exporters experience a large jump on their output and, since they are still more productive than most rms in the economy, also induce gains in the average productivity.
Both selection and entry are much weaker in the latent heterogeneity model than in the strict sorting model. We have seen that strict sorting greatly overpredicts the size of exporters, that is, their productivity. The latent heterogeneity reconciles the model and data: exporters are still more productive than non-exporters, but only modestly so. Moreover there is much less entry in the latent heterogeneity model, so the second source of productivity gains is weaker too.
We conclude our analysis with a look at how the average exporter changes with the trade liberalization. Figure 6 displays the average among exporters for export revenues, export output, average productivity, and total employment. It must be emphasized that the set of exporters changes as we cut the trade costs. First we note that export revenues and output grow much faster in the latent heterogeneity model. This is, of course, the ip side of the results on the extensive margin documented in Table 7 . Second, the average productivity for exporters falls in both models but by dierent amounts, as shown in the bottom left panel 18 Melitz (2003) refers to is as the combined average productivity and shows it completely summarizes the eects of the distribution of productivity levels on the aggregate outcome.
in Figure 6 . In both models new exporters are less productive than incumbent exporters; but in the strict sorting they are much less so. As a result the exporter average productivity drops by a staggering 6% while only a modest 1% in the latent heterogeneity.
The dierences in the average output and productivity of exporters combine for opposite predictions with respect to the total employment for exporter. In the strict sorting model exporters, on average, employ less workers as trade costs fall. New exporters do employ more workers than before entering the foreign market. However, they are so small compared with the incumbent exporters that they bring the average down by an astounding 25%.
Recall that the number of exporters grows by more than 50% so entry has a big impact on averages. In contrast total employment for exporter grows in latent heterogeneity, as the weaker selection and entry eects cannot overturn the employment gains due to overall expansion of exports.
Robustness
We briey discuss here alternative specications for the common structure of both models.
We start with our choice of the lognormal distribution for rm productivity. In particular, theory work has favored instead the Pareto distribution for its tractability. 20 However, the Pareto distribution proves to be a very restrictive choice for our purposes. As we discussed in Section 4.3, a Pareto distribution for rm productivity implies that average export sales per exporter are constant. Thus as trade costs fall all the adjustment must occur through the extensive margin, that is, the number of exporters.
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This exclusive role of the extensive margin is clearly at odds with the data. Instead we favor a more exible specication that allows for both margins to be active. Finally we also explore some alternative parameter specications. 21 It is important to recall that we have abstracted from general equilibrium eects on the wage rate which, in turn, could have aected the x costs associated with exporting. This channel is operative in Melitz (2003) and leads to adjustment along the intensive margin. a trade cost reduction of 10 percentage points for both the strict sorting (SS) and the latent heterogeneity (LH) model. In addition to the baseline calibration, we consider two alternative parameterizations. In the rst we set the elasticity of substitution between exports to 12.
There is no signicant change for both models predictions for the growth rate of exports and exporters, but there is now virtually no aggregate productivity growth. This shows that the love of variety eect is the main driver of aggregate productivity. We also look at a second parametrization with a very low price elasticity of aggregate exports. Naturally total trade growth is smaller as demand does not react to the fall in costs. Interestingly aggregate productivity displays similar gains. size. We note that while the model in Arkolakis (2008) can explain the presence of exporters with small exports, it does not explain why some small rms export and some large rms do not. In other words, the strict sorting in total sales between exporters and non-exporters is preserved.
Our rst observation is that, as long as the strict property is preserved, variation in export intensity cannot reconcile the model with the data. The simplest way to see this is to compute the exporter size premium in terms of domestic sales under strict sorting, following the same procedure we did with total sales. We report the results in Table 9 . Excluding foreign sales does not reduce the disparity between the data and model. This is perhaps not surprising given that foreign sales are a small fraction of total sales for the U.S.
We also note that small exporters arise naturally once we introduce latent heterogeneity.
A small rm may export despite its low productivity if it draws a small xed cost. Such a 22 The export intensity, that is, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales per rm, is on average 14% among exporters. Under strict sorting, the smallest exporter's total sales is just below $5 million. Table 9 : Exporter Size Premium in terms of Domestic Sales.
rm will export little as it will not be competitive abroad. We use the tted distribution in Section 3 as well as a constant export intensity of 14% in order to generate a distribution of export sales. We nd that, under latent heterogeneity, over a quarter of exporters sell less than $50, 000 abroad. Recall that under the strict sorting model the smallest exporter would have about $1 million in foreign sales. Thus latent heterogeneity goes a long way in explaining the presence of small exporters. That said, many exporters sell a very small amount in the datae.g., less than $20, 000. For the latent heterogeneity to match this, we would need even more variation in the latent variable. However, such a small amount suggests that a fraction of exporters are rms that are not actively selling in a foreign market but rather they just fulll the occasional order coming from abroad.
Industry-level Heterogeneity
Here we explore whether the latent heterogeneity stems from between-industry variation.
Manufacturing include goods as diverse as tobacco products and machinery. So it is quite reasonable to think that sectors face very dierent trade costs, both xed and variable. If the required heterogeneity is present at a very aggregate level then we may be able to capture it with a simple two-sector specication, with a tradable and a non-tradable sector.
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More generally, we compute the size premium implied by strict sorting for each three-digit NAICS industry code. The procedure is the same we used in Section 2 for manufacturing as In Printing only 5% of the rms exports, while in Computer and electronic products almost 40% of the rms do. We also have the summary of the distribution of total sales for each sectoras in Table 1provided by the Census. Table 10 reports the size premium as predicted by strict sorting for each three digit NAICS code. We compute a lower bound by assuming that all rms within any given size bin are identical; we also report a point estimate based on a tted Pareto distribution.
Both deliver the same message: for each sector the predicted size premium is very large.
The reason is that the rm size distribution within a sector remains very skewed, so any strict sorting exercise is bound to return large size premia. it does not get them in the range observed in the data. As we saw in Table 3 the skewness in total sales is such that even if exporters were way more common that actually observed the implied size premium would remain very large.
Sunk Costs
So far we have considered sources of variation in the export decision in a static framework.
However it is well-known that the data displays a fair amount of export hysteresis which provides support for the presence of sunk costs.
24 While we are not concerned with the dynamics of exporting per se, export hysteresis has important implications for the cross-24 Baldwin(1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) are credited with developing the rst theories of export hysteresis. Roberts and Tybout (1997) evaluate empirically the role of sunk costs through reduced form models. More recent work has estimated structural models with sunk costs: see Das et al. (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008) . sectional of exporters. In the presence of sunk costs, the exporter status of a rm is not determined alone by its current productivity. An exporter may have no reason to stop exporting for productivity level ϕ as it can still cover the per-period xed costs. The same productivity level, though, may not be high enough to convince a rm to start exporting as it will not cover the sunk costs. Indeed, there seems to be a basis for this possibility. Choi (2007, 2008) calibrate models of sunk export costs that match the size and share of exporters, as well as the distribution of rm size in manufacturing. In these papers, though, there are many other sources of heterogeneity so it is not clear the quantitative role of export hysteresis in explaining the cross-sectional facts.
It is thus possible that the history of each rm provides the necessary heterogeneity to match the exporter size premium. A full analysis of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. We include here a simple exercise that suggests that sunk costs can explain the share and size of exporters, but only by shifting the size puzzle from exporters to new exporters.
Consider the following variation of the reduced-form model in Section 3. Firm i total sales at date d, denoted r id , are an iid random variable, with distribution Ψ r . Since we do not evaluate the model at any frequency, the lack of any persistence is not particularly worrisome and allows for an easy characterization. There are two thresholds, t 0 and t 1 with t 0 ≤ t 1 , that determine the transition in and out from the foreign market as follows:
• An exporter at date d − 1 exports at date d if r id ≥ t 0 .
• A non-exporter at date d − 1 exports at date d if r id ≥ t 1 .
All readers familiar with sunk cost models will recognize the thresholds t 0 and t 1 as the stopper and starter points.
We now briey show how we map the observations on the share and size of exporters, given the distribution of total sales, to pin down the stopper and starter points. The rst equation to use is the steady-state condition on the share of exporters. Clearly a fraction Ψ r (t 0 ) of previous exporters exit the exporter market, while a fraction 1 − Ψ r (t 1 ) of the previously non-exporters start exporting now. If the share of exporters is constant, we must have that
With some manipulation we have that equation (17) gives the share of exporters as a function of the starter and stopper points,
Note the measure of exporters between t 0 and t 1 is simply (Ψ r (t 1 ) − Ψ r (t 0 ))s x , so their proportion among exporters themselves is just Ψ r (t 1 ) − Ψ r (t 0 ). We can then compute then the average total sales by exporters as
We then solve for the two equations (17) and (19) with t 0 and t 1 as the two unknowns. We have no problem nding values for t 0 and t 1 that match the share and size of exporters.
As simple as the set up is, we can actually compute the entry and exit rates. We nd that both are quite small (2.5% and 11.5% respectively) indicating that there is a lot of persistence in the export status of the rm. Unfortunately it is dicult to compare the numbers with the data since we did not specify at what frequency the model is operating. Given our assumption that total sales are iid, we should take a period to be at very least ve years.
At that frequency the exit rate is very low compared with the data, as Bernard and Jensen (1999) report an annual stopper rate of 17%.
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While the sunk cost model breaks the strict sorting between exporters and non-exporters, it now features strict sorting between new exporters and non-exporters. Because the entry rate is so small, the threshold for entry is way deep in the tail of the distribution (the 98th
percentile to be precise). The size premium between new exporters and non-exporters is thus even larger, on the neighborhood of 200. All empirical evidence point to new exporters being signicantly smaller than existing exportersso it looks like to reconcile the sunk cost model with the size of new exporters we will need, again, a lot of independent variation in the entry decision.
Relaxing independence
We return to our tting exercise from Section 3 and drop the assumption that the latent variable t i is independent of rm size. Some rm characteristicse.g., managerial quality, geographical locationmay simultaneously aect total sales and the costs associated with exporting. We do not pursue any particular hypothesis. Instead we will explore what kind of correlation between total sales and the latent variable would reduce the size-independent variation needed to match the data.
We now allow for total sales and the latent variable {r i , t i } to be jointly distributed according to a Lognormal with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ. We parameterize the joint distribution in terms of the latent variable:
where i is independent of total sales r i and distributed according to a Lognormal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ . The parameter γ governs the correlation between total sales r i and the latent variable t i . It is easy to rewrite the model in terms of total sales r i and independent variation i . Firm i exports if r i ≥ t i or, in logs and in terms of i ,
(1 − γ) log(r i ) ≥ log( i ). 25 The rate is for U.S. establishments in the period 1984-1992.
Given a value for γ we can proceed as we did in Section 3 to nd values for µ and σ such that the model matches the share and size of exporters observed in the data.
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We nd that total sales and the latent variable have to be positively correlated in order to reduce the amount of variation independent of rm size, that is, γ > 0. The reason is quite straightforward. Strict sorting overestimates the size of exporters. Having larger rms clear, on average, a higher hurdle to start exporting reduces the number of large rms that export. There is then less need for the size-independent variable i to take large values with high probability.
A positive correlation between rm-size and the latent variable questions the hypothesis that rms face xed costs associated with exporting. A more natural explanation is that domestic and export production both require some input that is on a xed supply at the rm-level. For example, each rm may be endowed with one manager with a limited span of control as in Lucas (1978) . For rms with a higher labor productivity, the opportunity cost of the manager's control is higher.
It should be made clear that the positive correlation does not rule out non-convexities but rather suggests that they require a more nuanced approach. For example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) assume rms face some downtime when replacing machines or, more generally, when pursuing some investmentlike upgrading the production process for exporting. The non-convexity arises because it is not possible to replace, say, a fraction of a machine with a fraction of the downtime. The down time is more expensive for more productive rms, so while the investment technology is identical across rms, the cost of investment is higher for larger rms.
Another possibility is that large rms face dierent market conditions than small rms.
For example, the fair wage literature links the wages paid with the rm protability.
27 If the overhead costs of exporting are in terms of in-rm labor, then more productive rms would face a higher cost of exporting. 26 Let log(h i ) = (1−γ) log(r i ). Given γ and the distribution of total sales Ψ r , we can derive the distribution Ψ r . The share of exporters is the share of rms with log(h i ) ≥ log( i ), so
Similarly, the size premium is related to the log dierence in h i between exporters and non-exporters: 27 The literature dates back to Akerlo (1982) . It has been recently introduced in international trade. See Amiti and Davis (2008) for example. 6 .5 Heterogeneity in trade costs and foreign demand So far we have explored some hypothesis for the large amount of size-independent variation needed to match the data on the size and share of exporters. We have not, though, explored the implications of these hypothesis in the event of a trade liberalization. Perhaps our results in Section 5 are tied to the assumption that xed costs explain all the variation in the data. An obvious alternative is that rms have heterogeneous trade costs or there rm-market demand heterogeneity, as perhaps foreign consumers do not value quality as domestic consumers do.
28 Since foreign sales are small fraction of total sales for U.S. rms, heterogeneity in trade costs or foreign demand would be essentially independent of size.
We nd that the model implications are virtually unchanged if the necessary size-independent variation is modeled as heterogeneous xed costs, trade costs, or foreign demand.
29 It is easy to see why this is the case. First, if the additional heterogeneity enters the exporter revenues multiplicatively, then the resulting model is actually isomorphic to heterogeneity in xed costs. The reason is that the model is essentially loglinear. Consider this simple specication: on the top of the trade costs τ , the marginal cost of rm's ω exports is (1 + η (ω)) times more the marginal cost for output sold at the domestic market. That is, rms dier on the variable costs associated with exporting.
We can rewrite (10) in this model as
The entry condition (11) would now be
We could, though, simply denef (ω) = f (ω) (1 + η (ω)) θ and the equilibrium condition is identical.
30 Quantitatively we would calibrate the distribution of both η and f to reproduce the variation in the latent variablein other words, we would calibrate the variablef (ω) as we did with f (ω) in Section 4. So as long η and f remain independent of ϕ, the results would be unchanged.
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We do not expect big dierences even if the conditions for the isomorphism do not apply.
Say we consider rm variation in the trade costs per unit, that is, the marginal cost of a rm is now η (ω) + τ w/ϕ(ω). In this case the entry condition (11) is not loglinear. We can, 28 Munch and Nguyen (2008) nd rm-specic factors as productivity explain a very small fraction of the sales variation across destinations for Danish exporters. 29 As long, of course, as the full amount of latent heterogeneity is captured by the specication of choice. 30 This requires, of course, that the additional heterogeneity is normalized such that it does not change the baseline calibration or the policy experiment. 31 The source of heterogeneity will make a dierence in a general equilibrium model or in the computation of the transition dynamics. We are skeptical, though, that the dierences will be economically signicant.
though, think of a nth order log-approximation to (10) around the representative rm type, ω. The higher order terms may be important for large reductions of trade costs: they do, though, only on the measure that the variation η interacts with the productivity parameter, ϕ. This interaction is not captured by the latent variable in Section 3so non-multiplicative factors aect results only on the measure that they induce departures from the assumption of linear independence.
The Extensive Margin in the Data
The empirical literature has not come to a consensus on the quantitative importance of the extensive margin for aggregate trade patterns. This reects, in part, that there is no unique concept of the extensive margin: one can dene entry and exit at the level of the rm, plant, or product.
Two papers are well-known for arguing that the extensive margin is an important dimension of aggregate data. Hummels and Klenow (2005) However, this is not without implications. First, we need a large amount of independent variation, suggesting that rm size is not the main determinant of the export status of a rm. Second, the augmented model has a minor role for the extensive margin in the event of a trade liberalization; and the productivity gains due to reallocation of resources are smaller than in the standard model.
Given the attention the literature has given to the extensive margin, it is quite surprising that the calibrated version of the Melitz model features only small changes in export participation which, in addition, contribute little to overall trade growth. This puzzle appears quite robust: the source of variation at work does not seem important. In order to generate relatively small exporters, one needs to assume that larger rms face signicantly larger costs of exporting, which seems at odds with the concept of xed costs.
We nd the ideas in Melitz 
